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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-445
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LENARD RAY BEECHAM, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

KIRBY LEE JONES, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fourth circuit
[May 16, 1994]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Today we construe three provisions of the federal fire-
arms statutes:
      -It shall be unlawful for any person who has been
convicted . . . [of] a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to possess]
any firearm . . . .-  18 U. S. C. 922(g).
      -What constitutes a conviction . . . shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction
in which the proceedings were held.-  921(a)(20)
(the choice-of-law clause).
      -Any conviction which has been expunged, or set
aside or for which a person has been pardoned or
has had civil rights restored shall not be considered
a conviction . . . .-  Ibid. (the exemption clause).
The question before us is which jurisdiction's law is to
be considered in determining whether a felon -has had
civil rights restored- for a prior federal conviction.

                            I
  Each of the petitioners was convicted of violating
922(g).  Beecham was convicted in Federal District
Court in North Carolina, Jones in Federal District Court
in West Virginia.  Beecham's relevant prior conviction
was a 1979 federal conviction in Tennessee, for violating
18 U. S. C. 922(h).  App. 11.  Jones' prior convictions
were two West Virginia state convictions, for breaking
and entering and for forgery, and one 1971 federal
conviction in Ohio for interstate transportation of a
stolen automobile.  Id., at 19-20.
  Jones had gotten his civil rights restored by West Vir-
ginia, so his two West Virginia state convictions were
not considered.  Beecham claimed his civil rights had
been restored by Tennessee, the State in which he had
been convicted of his federal offense.  The question pre-
sented to the District Courts was whether these restora-
tions of civil rights by States could remove the disabi-
lities imposed as a result of Beecham's and Jones' fede-
ral convictions.
  In both cases, the District Courts concluded the
answer was -yes,- though for different reasons: In
Beecham's case the court looked to the law of the State
in which the earlier federal crime was committed (Ten-
nessee); in Jones' case the court looked to the law of the
State in which Jones lived when he committed the
922(g) offense (West Virginia).  The Fourth Circuit re-
versed both rulings, reasoning that state restoration of
civil rights could not undo the federal disability flowing
from a federal conviction.  We granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict this decision created with United
States v. Edwards, 946 F. 2d 1347 (CA8 1991), and Uni-
ted States v. Geyler, 932 F. 2d 1330 (CA9 1991).  510
U. S. ___ (1993).

                           II
  The question in this case is how the choice-of-law
clause and the exemption clause of 921(a)(20) are re-
lated.  If, as the Fourth Circuit held, the choice-of-law
clause applies to the exemption clause, then we must
look to whether Beecham's and Jones' civil rights were
restored under federal law (the law of the jurisdiction in
which the earlier proceedings were held).  On the other
hand, if, as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits concluded,
the two clauses ought to be read separately, see Geyler,
supra, at 1334-1335; Edwards, supra, at 1349-1350,
then we would have to come up with a special choice-of-
law principle for the exemption clause.
  We think the Fourth Circuit's reading is the better
one.  Throughout the statutory scheme, the inquiry is:
Does the person have a qualifying conviction on his rec-
ord?  Section 922(g) imposes a disability on people who
-ha[ve] been convicted.-  The choice-of-law clause defines
the rule for determining -[w]hat constitutes a convic-
tion.-  The exemption clause says that a conviction for
which a person has had civil rights restored -shall not
be considered a conviction.-  Asking whether a person
has had civil rights restored is thus just one step in de-
termining whether something should -be considered a
conviction.-  By the terms of the choice-of-law clause,
this determination is governed by the law of the convict-
ing jurisdiction.
  This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
other three procedures listed in the exemption
clause-pardons, expungements, and set-asides-are
either always or almost always (depending on whether
one considers a federal grant of habeas corpus to be a
-set aside,- a question we do not now decide) done by
the jurisdiction of conviction.  That several items in a
list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpeting
the other items as possessing that attribute as well.

Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990); Third Nat.
Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U. S. 312,
322 (1977); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303,
307 (1961).  Though this canon of construction is by no
means a hard and fast rule, it is a factor pointing to-
wards the Fourth Circuit's construction of the statute.
  In light of the statutory structure, the fact that both
clauses speak of -conviction[s]- rebuts the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits' argument that the two clauses -pertain
to two entirely different sets of circumstances---the
question of what constitutes a conviction- and -the effect
of post-conviction events.-  Geyler, supra, at 1334-1335;
see also Edwards, supra, at 1349.  The exemption clause
does not simply say that a person whose civil rights
have been restored is exempted from 922(g)'s firearms
disqualification.  It says that the person's conviction
-shall not be considered a conviction.-  The effect of
postconviction events is therefore, under the statutory
scheme, just one element of the question of what con-
stitutes a conviction.
  Likewise, the presence of the choice-of-law clause
rebuts the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' argument that the
-plain, unlimited language,- Edwards, supra, at 1349;
see also Geyler, supra, at 1334, of the exemption
clause-with its reference to -[a]ny conviction . . . for
which a person has . . . had civil rights restored-
(emphasis added)-refers to all civil rights restorations,
even those by a jurisdiction other than the one in which
the conviction was entered.  Regardless of what the
quoted phrase might mean standing alone, in conjunc-
tion with the choice-of-law clause it must refer only to
restorations of civil rights by the convicting jurisdiction.
The plain meaning that we seek to discern is the plain
meaning of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences.
See King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. ___, ___
(1991) (slip op., at 5-7); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U. S. 107, 115 (1989); Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Re-
venue, 488 U. S. 19, 26 (1988).
  We are also unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit's argu-
ment that -[b]ecause there is no federal procedure for
restoring civil rights to a federal felon, Congress could
not have expected that the federal government would
perform this function,- and that therefore -[t]he refer-
ence in 921(a)(20) to the restoration of civil rights must
be to the state procedure.-  Geyler, 932 F. 2d, at 1333.
This reasoning assumes that Congress intended felons
convicted by all jurisdictions to have access to all the
procedures (pardon, expungement, set-aside, and civil
rights restoration) specified in the exemption clause; but
nothing in 921(a)(20) supports the assumption on which
this reasoning is based.  Many jurisdictions have no pro-
cedure for restoring civil rights.  See Apps. A and B to
Brief for Petitioners (indicating that at least 12 States-
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, and Virginia suspend felons' civil rights but
provide no procedure for restoring them); see, e.g.,
Mo. Rev. Stat. 561.026 (1979 and Supp. 1994); United
States v. Thomas, 991 F. 2d 206, 213-214 (CA5) (Texas
law), cert. denied, 510 U. S. ___ (1993).  However one
reads the statutory scheme-as looking to the law of the
convicting jurisdiction, or to the law of the State in
which the prior conduct took place, or to the law of the
State in which the felon now lives or has at one time
lived-people in some jurisdictions would have options
open to them that people in other jurisdictions may lack.
Under our reading of the statute, a person convicted in
federal court is no worse off than a person convicted in
a court of a State that does not restore civil rights.
  Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the
rule of lenity, which petitioners urge us to employ here,
is inapplicable.  See Chapman v. United States, 500
U. S. 453, 463-464 (1991).  Of course, by denying the
existence of an ambiguity, we do not claim to be perfectly
certain that we have divined Congress' intentions as to
this particular situation.  It is possible that the phrases
on which our reading of the statute turns--[w]hat
constitutes a conviction- and -shall not be considered a
conviction--were accidents of statutory drafting; it is
possible that some legislators thought the two sentences
of 921(a)(20) should be read separately, or, more likely,
that they never considered the matter at all.  And we
recognize that in enacting the choice-of-law clause,
legislators may have been simply responding to our
decision in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460
U. S. 103 (1983), which held that federal law rather
than state law controls the definition of what constitutes
a conviction, not setting forth a choice-of-law principle
for the restoration of civil rights following a conviction.
  But our task is not the hopeless one of ascertaining
what the legislators who passed the law would have de-
cided had they reconvened to consider petitioners' parti-
cular case.  Rather, it is to determine whether the lan-
guage the legislators actually enacted has a plain, un-
ambiguous meaning.  In this case, we believe it does.

                           III
  We therefore conclude that petitioners can take advan-
tage of 921(a)(20) only if they have had their civil
rights restored under federal law, and accordingly affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
                                            So ordered.